Abstract. Recently, Bellare and Palacio succeeded in defining the plaintext awareness, which is also called PA2, in the standard model. They propose three valiants of the standard model PA2 named perfect, statistical, and computational PA2. In this paper, we study the relationship between the standard model PA2 and the property about message hiding, that is, IND-CPA. Although it seems that these two are independent notions at first glance, we show that all of the perfect, statistical, and computational PA2 in the standard model imply the IND-CPA security if the encryption function is oneway. By using this result, we also showed that "PA2 + Oneway ⇒ IND-CCA2". This result shows the "all-or-nothing" aspect of the PA2. That is, a standard model PA2 secure public-key encryption scheme either satisfies the strongest message hiding property, IND-CCA2, or does not satisfy even the weakest message hiding property, onewayness. We also showed that the computational PA2 notion is strictly stronger than the statistical one.
Introduction
The Plaintext Awareness [BR94,BDPR98,HLM03,BP04], which is also known as PA2, is a notion about the security of a public-key encryption scheme. Intuitively, we say that a public-key encryption scheme satisfies the PA2, if no adversary can generate a ciphertext "without knowing" the corresponding plaintext.
The PA2 notion is important, because it implies the chosen ciphertext security [BR94, BDPR98, BP04] , if a public-key encryption scheme is the IND-CPA secure. Moreover, it is useful when one instantiates the ideal functions in the Dolev-Yao model [DY83] , since the relation between the PA2 and the Dolev-Yao model is known [HLM03] .
The original definition of the PA2 security was formalized in the random oracle model [BR94, BDPR98] and was highly dependent on this model, although the intuitive definition, mentioned above, does not depend on this model. Therefore, in the earlier study of the PA2, one of the main concerns was how to define the PA2 in the standard model.
In Asiacrypt 2004, Bellare and Palacio [BP04] succeeded in defining the standard model PA2. Their result is important, because we can analize encryption schemes from the new view point whether these are PA2 secure. Here we briefly review their definition. They define PA2 notion based on the indistinguishabilty of two worlds, "Dec world", and "Ext world". An adversary in the Dec world can access the decryption oracle and so on. In contrast, the adversary in the Ext world can access an extractor, which simulates the decryption oracle, and so on. The extractor has to simulate the decryption oracle by using only data "which the adversary knows". They define the three types of the PA2, named perfect/statistical/computational PA2, depending on that the Dec world and the Ext world are perfectly/statistically/computationally indistinguishable for the adversary.
They also succeeded in proving the fundamental theorem, which state that all of these plaintext awareness notions, together with IND-CPA security, imply the chosen ciphertext security.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we study the relationship between the standard model PA2 and the property about message hiding, that is, IND-CPA. At first glance, it seems that these two are independent notions. Indeed, it is well known that the random oracle model PA2 property does not imply the IND-CPA property and vise versa.
We however show that all of the perfect, statistical, and computational PA2 security in the standard model imply the IND-CPA security if the encryption function is oneway. Recall that the fundamental theorem that "(perfect, statistical, or computational) PA2 + IND-CPA ⇒ IND-CCA2" holds. Therefore, our result combining with the fundamental theorem shows the stronger variant of the fundamental theorem, "(perfect, statistical, or computational) PA2 + Oneway ⇒ IND-CCA2". This result shows the "all-or-nothing" aspect of the PA2. That is, the standard model PA2 secure public-key encryption scheme either satisfies the strongest message hiding property, IND-CCA2, or does not satisfy even weakest message hiding property, onewayness.
Our result has not only theoretical interest but also can be useful when one prove the IND-CCA2 securities of public-key encryption schemes. Recall that it is non trivial to show the IND-CPA securities of some schemes satisfying the random oracle PA2, such as schemes with OAEP+ [OP01] , 3-round OAEP [PP04] , or Kobara-Imai [KI01] padding. However, in the case for schemes satisfying the standard model PA2, we are not required to prove the IND-CPA securities, since our result assures it.
We also study the gap between the computational and statistical PA2 securities. That is, we show that the computational PA2 security is strictly stronger than the statistical one. It is interesting to compare our result with Fujisaki's result [F06] about the random oracle PA2. In his paper, he defined a plaintext simulatability (PS) notion, which was a "computational variant" of the random oracle PA2, and showed that plaintext simulatability notion was strictly stronger than the random oracle PA2. Therefore, our result can be recognized as the standard model variant of Fujisaki's result [F06] . By comparing his result with our result, we can say that statistical and computational standard model PA2 notions are related to the random oracle PA2 and the PS, respectively.
We stress that, although our result and Fujisaki's result themselves are similar, these are of different model with different proof. Indeed we cannot use his proof because it highly depends on the random oracle model. Our proof is simpler and more intuitive than his.
Previous Works
Before the random oracle PA2 was defined, a weaker variant of it, named the random oracle PA1 [BR94] , had been defined. The first schemes satisfying the random oracle PA1 and PA2 were proposed in the paper of Bellare-Rogaway [BR94] and Fujisaki-Okamoto [FO99] respectively. In these papers, the authors proposed conversions which transform a trapdoor oneway permutation and an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme to PA1 and PA2 secure publickey encryption scheme respectively. These conversions are called the OAEP and the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversions respectively.
Shoup [S01] showed that the random oracle PA1 + IND-CPA does not imply the IND-CCA2 security, although previously it had been thought that it did. In his paper, he also gave a revised version of the OAEP conversion, named the OAEP+, which transforms a trapdoor oneway permutation to a PA2 secure public-key encryption scheme on the random oracle model. The OAEP and other conversions satisfying a similar property are also studied in
As far as we know, the first attempt to define the plaintext awareness not in the random oracle model was made by Herzog, Liskov, and Micali [HLM03] . They defined the PA2 notion on the key registration model [HLM03] and constructed a public-key encryption scheme which satisfies their PA2.
Bellare and Palacio [BP04] define not only the standard model PA2 but also the standard model PA1. They also showed that the Damgård [D91] and the lite Cramer-Shoup [CS01] public-key encryption schemes satisfy the standard model PA1 under the Diffie-Hellman Knowledge assumption [D91, BP04] and the DDH assumption. Later, Dent [D06] showed that the Cramer-Shoup publickey encryption scheme [CS98, CS01] satisfies the standard model PA2 security under the same assumption.
Organization
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the definition of the standard model PA2. In Section 3, we show that the statistical PA2 is strictly stronger than the computational one. In Section 4, we show the main theorem, which states that "(perfect, statistical, or computational) PA2 + Oneway ⇒ IND-CPA". Finally, in Section 5, we give the conclusion of our paper.
In this section, we review the definition of the standard model PA2 [BP04] . Before giving the formal definition of the standard model PA2, we give intuitive explanation about it. The definition of the standard model PA2 is based on the indistinguishability of two worlds, named Dec world and Ext world, and uses entities named adversary and extractor. In the Dec world, the adversary can access to the decryption oracle and the encryption oracle. In contrast, the adversary in the Ext world can access to the extractor and the encryption oracle. The extractor has to simulate the decryption oracle by using only data "which the adversary can see", that is, the adversary's description, its random tape, and the answers from the encryption oracle.
It is a characteristic feature for the definition that it has a mechanism to hide the encryption query of the adversary from the extractor. In order to hide the encryption query, the entity, named plaintext creator, is also introduced. It is an entity which makes encryption queries as the adversary's proxy. The adversary, in both Dec and Ext worlds, does not make encryption queries directly but sends an order to the plaintext creator, in order to make it send a query to the encryption oracle.
The extractor is not allowed to watch the plaintext creator's random tape, although it is allowed to watch the adversary's one. Hence it cannot know what queries are made to the encryption oracle. We say that an encryption scheme satisfies the standard model PA2, if the Dec and Ext worlds are indistinguishable for the adversary from each other.
We now define the standard model PA2 formally:
be a public-key encryption scheme. Let A, P, K be polytime machines, which are respectively called adversary, plaintext creator, and extractor. Let A(pk; R A ) denotes the execution of an algorithm A on inputting pk with the random coin R A . For a security parameter κ ∈ N, we define two experiments Exp
PA2-Dec
Π,A,P (κ) and Exp
PA2-Ext
Π,A,K,P (κ), shown in Fig. 1 . In these experiments, it is required that A makes no query (dec, C) for which C ∈ CList.
We say that the public-key encryption scheme Π is perfectly/statistically/computationally standard model PA2 secure if
PA2-Dec
PA2-Ext
Π,A,K,P (κ) are perfectly/statistically/computationally indistinguishable for κ.
Since we only discuss about the standard model PA2, we simply say that Π is perfectly/statistically/computationally PA2 secure if it is perfectly/statistically/computationally standard model PA2 secure.
Theorem 2 (Fundamental Theorem for Standard Model PA2 [BP04]).
Let Π be an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme. If Π is (perfect, statistical, or computational) PA2 secure, then Π is IND-CCA2 secure.
-Exp

PA2-Dec
Π,A,P (κ)-Take coins RA and RP for A and P randomly.
(Here StP is the state of P). Run A(pk; RA) until it halts, replying to its oracle queries as follows:
Send C to A as the reply. If A makes query (dec, Q) M ← Dec sk (Q). Send M to A as the reply. Return an output S of A.
-Exp
PA2-Ext
Π,A,K,P (κ)-Take coins RA, RP , and RK for A, P, and K randomly.
(Here StP and StK are the states of P and K). Run A(pk; RA) until it halts, replying to its oracle queries as follows:
If A makes query (enc, Q)
. Send M to A as the reply. Return an output S of A. Fig. 1 . Experiments used to define PA2 of [BP04] 3 Statistical PA2 is Stronger than Computational PA2
In this section, we show that the computational PA2 security is strictly stronger than the statistical one. That is, we give an example of a computational PA2 secure public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen , Enc , Dec ) which is not statistical PA2 secure.
Let κ be a security parameter. Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme which is statistical PA2 secure and IND-CPA secure (and therefore IND-CCA2 secure). For instance, we can set Π to the Cramer-Shoup scheme [CS01] , if the Diffie-Hellman Knowledge assumption [D91, BP04] and the DDH assumption holds. We construct the desired public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen , Enc , Dec ) by modifying Π. The key generation algorithm Gen (1 κ ) first executes Gen(1 κ ) and obtains a public key/secret key pair (pk, sk) as the output. After that, it selects a message M 0 randomly and computes a ciphertext C 0 = Enc pk (M 0 ). Then it sets pk = (pk, C 0 ) and sk = sk. Finally, it outputs the public key/secret key pair (pk , sk ). We also set Enc pk (M ) = Enc pk (M ) and Dec sk (C) = Dec sk (C). See Fig. 2 also for the description of Π .
We first see that Π is not statistical PA2 secure. In order to see it, we construct an adversary A 0 such that no extractor can extract a message from the ciphertext output by A 0 . Our adversary A 0 is the one who obtains C 0 from its input pk = (pk, C 0 ) and outputs C 0 . Recall that not A 0 but the key generation algorithm Gen generates M 0 and C 0 . Therefore, A 0 "does not know" the message
Parse pk as (pk, C0) and output C0. M 0 corresponding to C 0 . Since an extractor K is input only data which the adversary can see, K "cannot know" M 0 = Dec sk (C 0 ) = Dec sk (C 0 ) either. This means that Π is not statistical PA2 secure. However, we can show that Π is the computational PA2 secure. At first glance, it seems that Π cannot be computational PA2 secure either, because even an extractor K for the computational PA2 "cannot know" M 0 = Dec sk (C 0 ) either. However, we actually do not require the extractor who "can know" such M 0 . Recall that the extractor K is only required to simulate the decryption oracle in such a way that an adversary A 0 cannot computationally distinguish the output of K from that of decryption oracle. Therefore, K does not need to output the plaintext M 0 itself, but can output the plaintext M 1 such that A 0 cannot computationally distinguish the distribution of M 1 from that of M 0 .
Recall that A 0 "knows" neither the plaintext M 0 nor the random number r which was used in the computation of C 0 = Enc pk (M 0 ; r). Recall also that Π satisfies the IND-CCA2 security. Hence, A 0 cannot distinguish a randomly selected message M 1 from M 0 . Therefore, K can output a randomly selected message M 1 as the answer to the decryption query C 0 .
Based on the above discussion, we can prove the following theorem. It is interesting to compare our result with Fujisaki's result [F06] about the random oracle PA2. In his paper, he defined a plaintext simulatability (PS) notion, which was an "computational variant" of the random oracle PA2, and showed that plaintext simulatability notion was strictly stronger than the random oracle PA2. Therefore, our result can be recognized as the standard model variant of Fujisaki's result [F06] . By comparing his result with our result, we can say that statistical and computational standard model PA2 notions is related to the random oracle PA2 and the PS, respectively.
PA2-0together with Onewayness Implies IND-CPA
Our main result is the following: Theorem 4. Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme, which satisfies the onewayness property. If Π is perfectly, statistically, or computationally PA2 secure, then Π is IND-CPA secure, (and therefore IND-CCA2 secure).
This result shows the "all-or-nothing" aspect of the PA2. That is, the (perfect, statistical, or computational) PA2 secure encryption scheme either satisfies the strongest message hiding property, IND-CCA2, or does not satisfy even the weakest message hiding property, onewayness.
Before proving Theorem 4, we see that one cannot remove the onewayness assumption from Theorem 4:
Theorem 5. There is a public-key encryption which is perfect PA2 secure but is neither oneway nor IND-CPA secure.
Proof (Theorem 5, sketch). Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme, such that an encryption Enc pk (M ) of a message M is M itself. Then Π is clearly not IND-CPA secure. Recall the definition of the statistical PA2. We say that Π satisfies the statistical PA2 security if, for any adversary A, there exists an extractor K such that K succeeds in extracting the plaintext M which corresponds to a ciphertext C output by A. Since K can know the message M directly from the ciphertext itself, Π satisfies the perfect PA2.
We first prove Theorem 4 for the special case where Π is statistically PA2 secure. Theorem 4 for the perfect PA2 security is clearly followed from it.
Proof (Theorem 4 for the statistical PA2, sketch). Let us make a contradictory supposition. That is, we suppose that there exists a statistically PA2 secure public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) which is not IND-CPA secure. Then we show that Π is not oneway.
In order to show it, we construct an adversary A 0 which satisfies the following tricky property: A 0 can obtain a ciphertext C 0 such that (1) A 0 "does not know" the plaintext M 0 = Dec sk (C 0 ) and (2) C 0 is not generated by the encryption oracle. For a moment, suppose that we succeed in constructing such A 0 . Since C 0 is not generated by the encryption oracle, A 0 can make the query C 0 to the decryption oracle. Then, from the definition of the plaintext awareness, there exists an extractor K which can extract the plaintext M 0 from the query C 0 of A 0 . (Here we exploit the supposition that Π is statistically PA2 secure). This means that K succeeds in outputting the unknown plaintext M 0 of a ciphertext C 0 . That is, K can invert the encryption function Enc. This contradicts to the assumption that Π is oneway.
We next describe how to construct A 0 . At first glance, it seems impossible to construct such A 0 , since the definition of the plaintext awareness disable A 0 generating a ciphertext C 0 "without knowing" the corresponding plaintext M 0 .
The basic idea how A 0 obtains such ciphertext C 0 is similar to that used in Section 3. In Section 3, the adversary obtains such C 0 from the key generation algorithm. In this proof, A 0 obtains such C 0 from another entity, that is, a plaintext creator P 0 . Then A 0 "does not know" the message M 0 corresponding to C 0 , since not A 0 itself but P 0 generates C 0 . (We stress that not the encryption oracle but P 0 itself generates C 0 . If the encryption oracle generates C 0 , A 0 cannot send C 0 to the decryption oracle).
In order to employ the technique mentioned above, P 0 has to send C 0 to A 0 . However, there is no inherent communication channel which enables P 0 to send C 0 directly to A 0 . So, we construct a "virtual" communication channel from P 0 to A 0 .
Here we exploit the assumption that the public-key encryption scheme Π is not IND-CPA secure. Recall that the definition of the statistical PA2 security allows P 0 to send plaintexts to the encryption oracle. Therefore, P 0 can send to A 0 a ciphertext c such that P 0 generates the corresponding plaintext. Since Π is not IND-CPA secure, the ciphertext c leaks information of the corresponding plaintext. This means that P 0 can send to A 0 some sort of information via the ciphertext c. That is, P 0 can use the ciphertext as the virtual channel.
We now describe more precisely how P 0 "sends" C 0 to A 0 . Let pk 0 be a public key and sk 0 be the unknown secret key corresponding to pk 0 . Since Π is not IND-CPA secure, there exist an algorithm B, a state St B of B, a pair of messages (m 0 , m 1 ), and a non negligible and non negative valued function µ = µ(κ) satisfying
We set N to 1/µ . Let b i be the i-th bit of the ciphertext C 0 = Enc pk 0 (M 0 ) such that M 0 is unknown. In advance, A 0 sends pk 0 ||m 0 ||m 1 ||N to P 0 , via the communication channel which enables A 0 to query. For each i, P 0 sends a message m bi as a query to the encryption oracle N times. Then the encryption oracle sends c We now give the proof for the general case where Π satisfies only the computational PA2 security.
Proof (Theorem 4 for the computational PA2, sketch). As in the case of the proof of for statistical PA2, we suppose that there exists a computationally PA2 secure public-key encryption scheme Π which is not IND-CPA secure. Then we show that Π is not oneway.
We use similar algorithms to A 0 and P 0 of the proof for the statistical PA2. However, in the case of Π is computational PA2, the extractor K may output a plaintext M which is not equal to the plaintext M 0 = Dec sk 0 (C 0 ), although the distribution of M has to be computationally indistinguishable from that of M 0 . Therefore, in order to obtain M 0 , we modify the description of A 0 and P 0 .
We will first construct an adversary A 1 by modifying A 0 . Then, for some extractor K, Exp PA2-Ext Π,A1,K,P (κ) is computationally indistinguishable from Exp PA2-Dec Π,A1,P (κ) for any P . Then, by modifying P 0 , we will construct a plaintext creator P 1 such that Exp
PA2-Ext
Π,A1,K,P1 (κ) is, in fact, statistically indistinguishable from Exp PA2-Dec Π,A1,P1 (κ), although we cannot exploit P 1 itself to obtain the secret plaintext M 0 . We will finally construct a plaintext creator P 2 , by modifying P 1 , such that P 2 can be exploited to obtain M 0 .
We will now give a brief description of A 1 and P 1 by describing the experiment Exp PA2-Dec Π,A1,P1 (κ). (We stress that we first choose A 1 , next obtain K, and finally choose P 1 , although we first describe about A 1 and P 1 , and next describe K. One can easily check that we can take K which does not depend on P 1 ). In the experiment Exp
PA2-Dec
Π,A1,P1 (κ), the experimenter first executes the key generation algorithm Gen(1 κ ) and obtains a public key/secret key pair (pk, sk) as an output. Then he inputs pk to the adversary A 1 , the encryption oracle, and the decryption oracle. He also inputs sk to the decryption oracle. Then A 1 executes B(pk) and obtains (m 0 , m 1 , St B ) as an output. After that, A 1 sends pk||m 0 ||m 1 ||N to P 1 , via the communication channel which enables A 1 to query. Here N = 1/µ .
Then P 1 generates a message M 1 randomly, and computes a ciphertext C 1 = Enc pk (M 1 ). After that, A 1 and P 1 execute the same procedures as those of A 0 and P 0 except that they execute these procedures using not C 0 but C 1 . That is, P 1 "sends" C 1 to A 1 via the "virtual" channel. After "receiving" C 1 from P 1 , A 1 makes query C 1 to the decryption oracle. Then the decryption oracle sends back a message M to A 1 as the answer to the query C 1 . (Note that the decryption oracle sends back a message M = M 1 = Dec sk (C 1 ), although an extractor K may send back a message M other than M 1 ).
After that, A 1 sends M to P 1 via the communication channel which enables A 1 to query. P 1 checks whether M 1 = M or not. Then P 1 sets S = 1 if M 1 = M , otherwise sets S = 0. After that, P 1 "sends" S to A 1 via the "virtual" channel. Finally, A 1 outputs S.
Then, for some extractor K, Exp
PA2-Ext
Π,A1,K,P (κ) is computationally indistinguishable from Exp PA2-Dec Π,A1,P (κ) for any P . In particular, Exp We next construct a plaintext creator P 2 , by modifying P 1 . Let (pk 0 , C 0 ) be an instance of the onewayness game, and sk 0 be the unknown secret key corresponding to pk 0 . Our goal is to compute M 0 = Dec sk 0 (C 0 ). The description of P 2 is equal to that of P 1 , except that (1) P 2 takes C 0 as an input, (2) P 2 does not use a ciphertext C 1 generated by P 2 itself but instead uses a part C 0 of the instance (pk 0 , C 0 ) of the onewayness game, and (3) P 2 always sets S = 1.
We consider a modified version of the experiment Exp
Π,A1,K,P2 (κ), named Exp PA2-Ext * Π,A1,K,P2 (κ, pk 0 , C 0 ), in which the experimenter uses not the public key pk generated by Gen(1 κ ) but instead uses a part pk 0 of the instance (pk 0 , C 0 ) of the onewayness game. Recall that both P 1 in Exp PA2-Ext Π,A1,K,P1 (κ) and P 2 in Exp PA2-Ext * Π,A1,K,P2 (κ, pk 0 , C 0 ) set S = 1 with overwhelming probability. Moreover, the distribution of (pk 0 , C 0 ) is equal to that of (pk, C) selected randomly. Hence, the behavior of P 1 in Exp PA2-Ext Π,A1,K,P1 (κ) is statistically indistinguishable from that of P 2 in Exp PA2-Ext * Π,A1,K,P2 (κ, pk 0 , C 0 ). (Recall that K is not input the random coin of a plaintext creator. Therefore, K cannot distinguish the behavior of P 1 from that of P 2 ).
Therefore, the distribution of the output of Exp PA2-Ext * Π,A1,K,P2 (κ, pk 0 , C 0 ) is statistically indistinguishable from that of the output of Exp
Π,A1,K,P1 (κ). Recall that, in the experiment Exp
Π,A1,K,P1 (κ), the output M of K is equal to M 1 = Dec sk 0 (C 1 ) with overwhelming probability. Therefore, even in the experiment Exp PA2-Ext * Π,A1,K,P2 (κ, pk 0 , C 0 ), the output M of K is equal to M 0 = Dec sk 0 (C 0 ) with overwhelming probability. This means that K succeeds in obtaining the unknown plaintext M 0 = Dec sk 0 (C 0 ) with overwhelming probability. 2
We see that Theorem 4 does not hold in the case of the random oracle PA2. See Appendix A for the definition of the random oracle PA2.
1
Proposition 6 Suppose that there exists a group G on which the DDH problem is easy although the CDH problem is hard. (For instance, we can set G to an elliptic curve group on which a bilinear pairing [BF01,MOV93,JN03,SOK01] is defined). Then there exists a public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) which satisfies the random oracle PA2 security and the onewayness but does not satisfy the IND-CPA security.
Proof (sketch). The desired encryption scheme is the Fujisaki-Okamoto [FO99] padded ElGamal encryption scheme such that a message and elements g and h of a public key (g, h) are taken from the above G. Similar to the case of the original Fujisaki-Okamoto padded ElGamal encryption scheme, we can prove that the encryption scheme satisfies the random oracle model PA2 security. Moreover, it satisfies onewayness since the CDH problem is hard on G. However, it does not satisfy the IND-CPA security since the DDH problem on G is easy. 2 By applying the similar idea to the Damgård scheme [D91] , one can also show that there exists a public-key encryption scheme which satisfies the standard model PA1 security [BP04] and the onewayness but does not satisfy the IND-CPA security. See Appendix A for the definition of the standard model PA1.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the relationship between the standard model PA2 and the property about message hiding, that is, IND-CPA. Although it seems that these two are independent notions at first glance, we showed that all of the perfect, statistical, and computational PA2 in the standard model imply the IND-CPA security if the encryption function is oneway. This result combining with the fundamental theorem implies the stronger variant of the fundamental theorem, "(perfect, statistical or computational) PA2 + Oneway ⇒ IND-CCA2". It shows the "all-or-nothing" aspect of the PA2. That is, a (perfect, statistical, or computational) PA2 secure public-key encryption scheme either satisfies the strongest message hiding property, IND-CCA2, or does not satisfy even the weakest message hiding property, onewayness.
We also showed that the computational PA2 notion is strictly stronger than the statistical one. By comparing Fujisaki's result [F06] with our result, we can say that statistical and computational standard model PA2 notions is related to the random oracle PA2 and the plaintext simulatability [F06] , respectively.
